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ABSTRACT

A study examined reports of the American invasions of the Dominican Republic (1965) and Grenada (1983) to determine whether there were substantive differences in coverage as a result of differing journalistic conditions. First-day New York Times reports of both invasions were analyzed both quantitatively (number of stories published, amount of illustrative material, etc.) and qualitatively (kinds of stories, datelines, sources, etc.). Analysis revealed several times as much coverage of the Grenada invasion, but the stories did not come from a proportionately greater number of sources. It is possible to account for these differences by considering the Times' additional quarter century of experience and the increased availability of electronic newsgathering equipment. The two events were also perceived differently, with the Dominican action being seen as a peacekeeping affair but Grenada involving more shooting. Many initial Grenada invasion reports later proved erroneous, so that while the Times warrants praise for its Grenada coverage, any praise must be tempered with an admonition against self-satisfaction with a job only partially done. (SG)

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New York Times First Day Coverage of Two U.S. Caribbean Invasions: A Comparative Content Analysis

by
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Submitted at the Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting
of the Speech Communication Association
in San Francisco, California
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Before the sun rose on October 25, 1983, a United States military force of approximately 1,900 Marines and Army Airborne troops invaded the tiny island country of Grenada. Within three days the invading force would climb to at least 3,000. This was the second time in less than 18 years that the United States had sent armed forces into a Caribbean nation. In that earlier incursion on April 28, 1965, a few hundred U.S. Marines entered the capital city of Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. A day later 2,500 airborne troops were added. On each of these occasions, the President of the United States declared the safety of American nationals as the reason for the invasion. While subsequent events and revelations have shed more light on both invasions and the reasons behind them, it is not the purpose of this paper to verify or disprove the motives asserted by asserted by Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan. Rather, this study attempts to examine the coverage of the first days of these events with a view to determining whether there were substantive difference in the coverage as a result of the differing journalistic conditions prevailing in each. The focus of this investigation will be the first day reports in the *New York Times* for both events.

The Conditions. The reports regarding events in the Dominican Republic could have been filed almost immediately from the scene of the action. Journalists in the area included Tad Szulc who later produced his *Dominican Diary*, a highly-praised, detailed, booklength version of the story. The Johnson administration may have controlled the news coming out of the Dominican Republic concerning events there, but it did so not by instituting any press ban but simply by lying to the press and, through the press, to the public. Dale Minor sums up the circumstances succinctly:

"...there is ample evidence in the record of the Dominican intervention that, from Tapley Bennett [W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., the U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic at the time] and General Palmer [Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, commander of U.S. military force in Santo Domingo] in the field, through the departments of State and Defense, to the President himself, deliberate and quite calculated lies were told to the American public." (*The Information War*, Hawthorn Books, (New York) 1970, p.23.

Minor's main point is that the claim of U.S. neutrality made by Johnson administration officials with regard to the military presence in the Domminican Republic was not borne out by the facts.

Shortly after their arrival in the Dominican Republic, U.S. paratroopers, sent in following the initial Marine contingents, took up positions which blocked the rebel forces from attacking the forces of the military junta. Then they opened a corridor that "effectively cut the rebel territory in half and surrounded its main stronghold..." Finally, the American forces, ostensibly there to keep the combatants apart and bring an end to the hostilities, allowed the junta forces to cross their lines under the eyes of U.S. television cameras and to attack the rebels. How the U.S. government managed to manage the news in view of the open disregard for fact which it exhibited on all levels is an issue to ponder. Whatever the result, reporters in Santo Domingo eventually told the story as it happened

Grenada was, quite literally, a different story. There, journalists were barred from the scene, supposedly to protect them from the dangers of covering a live fire fight. By October 27th, the *Times* was reporting on its front page that "the Reagan administration has barred reporters from Grenada and imposed extraordinary

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restrictions on news coverage of the military invasion of that island." No reporters would be permitted on the island until it was deemed safe by U.S. military commanders. A number of journalists who used a chartered fishing boat to reach the island were rapidly removed to a U.S. carrier, and ham radio operators, a major sources of news, were the target of Federal Communications Commission efforts to silence them. Whatever news about the invasion might reach the American public would be for the most part molded by the Reagan administration and its military minions.

In fact, the military may well have been the originators of the policy to restrict coverage. General John W. Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is thought to have been so impressed by Britain's control of press coverage of the Falkland Islands war in 1982 that he is considered to have defined the U.S. policy in Grenada. According to the *Times'* own story, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinbeger attributed the move to the U.S. military commanders involved and said that he "'wouldn't ever dream of overriding a commander's decision,'" (Oct. 27, 1983, pp.1 and 23.) Later, the Times reported Weinberger's role had been substantially more influential in the decision-making process than his initial remarks on the subject suggested.

The press, if it wanted to cover this story, was going to have to play by the administration's rules. Excluding reports from amateur radio operators and Radio Havana, there was no news from the island except from the military. Nor were there any pictures of the invasion, although some taken by the Defense Department photographers were scheduled to be reviewed and selected for release within a day or so.

Despite the protests of many major news organizations, the total ban on reporters was to remain in effect for two days and a partial ban for another two days. Under the modified ban initiated on Thursday, Oct. 27th, the Defense Department allowed a pool of 15 reporters to go to Grenada. More were to be allowed in on the following day. Although the three main news services, Reuters, the Associated Press and United Press International, were represented, no reporters from major U.S. newspapers were picked to go in with the pool, and a reporter from *U.S. News and World Report* was the only one representing magazine journalists. But the existence of the pools did not mean that the military was easing its control over the news. On the contrary, the pool reporters were selected by the military and were flown in for the afternoon only. They were taken in and moved about under military escort and according to a "set itinerary." (*Times*, October 29, p.1) The reporters were subsequently returned to Barbados from which they filed their stories. Basically, they were being given guided tours.

The first story in the *Times* with a St. George's, Grenada dateline was dated the 28th and appeared in the newspaper on Saturday the 29th. It was a piece about the arrival by truck of American and Caribbean troops in the capital. On that same day, American news organizations were continuing their protests against restrictions, claiming that important information was being bottled up. It was not, however, until November 5th, when full communications links with the outside world were restored, that reporters could begin to file regularly from the island.

The Times later reported that journalists had been misled about a number of events in the Grenada invasion. There was a bombing of a hospital that went unreported by government authorities for several days. There were highly inflated estimates of the number of Cubans involved on the island. Some of this misinformation was accidental, but some was not. On Nov. 1, the *Times* reported that one Reagan press official, deputy press secretary Les Janka resigned over "damage to his credibility resulting from the administration's handling of the

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Grenada invasion. Again, the government had lied.

Was there a difference in the *Times'* first day coverage of the two invasions?. If there was, what was the difference and what accounted for it? These are the questions addressed in the following analysis.

Methodology. This study attempts to evaluate coverage along two lines, one is quantitative, the other qualitative. Quantitative measures used include the number of stories published, amount of illustrative material used, and the placement of the stories. Qualitative measures have to do with the kinds of stories published, their datelines, bylines and sources. These measures are compared, analyzed and evaluated.

Grenada. The October 26, 1983 *New York Times* coverage of the Grenada invasion began with a 3-line, 6-column banner headline:

1,900 U.S. TROOPS, WITH CARIBBEAN ALLIES,
INVADE GRENADA AND FIGHT LEFTIST UNITS;
MOSCOW PROTESTS; BRITISH ARE CRITICAL

Under that headline, the Times ran five front page stories, two photographs, and a map. The closest any of the stories came to being filed from the site of the invasion was one datelined Bridgetown, Barbados. Three of the other stories originated in Washington. The last was out of London. All were labeled "Special to the New York Times." All were bylined.

It was not, of course, the *Times'* fault that the newspaper did not have reporters on the spot. About 10 days earlier, all foreign journalists had been expelled from Grenada by the regime which had come to power in a bloody coup. It is interesting to note that the U.S. military's ban simply extended one which already had been initiated earlier by the very regime it was now fighting. The *Times*, then, could not have had a reporter present in Grenada had it wanted to do so. In truth, despite the steady turmoil in Grenada in the days leading up to the invasion, there is little likelihood that the newspaper would have assigned a reporter full time to cover events there. After all, the Reagan administration had for months and months been making noises about the left-leaning government of the country and about its new lengthy airstrip as a potential launching site for soviet warplanes. The truth was, not one story on Grenada had appeared in the *Times* between the end of August and the middle of October when Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was first deposed and then killed by his deputy Bernard Coard.

But now that troops had invaded there were five stories on the front page alone. The lead story from Washington was written by Hedrick Smith. It reported President Reagan's announcement of the invasion and reasons which he offered as justification for the move. The story also outline Secretary of State George Shultz's remarks on the situation. It gave casualty and force numbers and indicated what general actions were being undertaken or had been accomplished. Also reported by Smith was the President's statement that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) has requested the invasion and that some of that organization's member countries had provided a total of about 300 troops for the invasion. Finally, on an interior, jump page, the article included a roundup of opinion and reaction from a variety of sources including congress and members of the Organization of American States. That this was the lead was indicated by its position on the page. It was placed under the banner in the outside right hand column, the spot reserved for the day's lead item.

One column in, and sharing the banner, was a story filed from Barbados by Michael T. Kaufman. This story reported in detail the actual military actions

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occurring. The information in this second story was extensive. It told of airfields seized, helicopter landings, the number of Cubans killed and captured in the initial battles, the military services involved, the parameter established by the invaders in the capital city of St. George's, and the securing of objectives such as the broadcasting station and the St. George's University School of Medicine with its approximately 500 U.S. students. More details about the composition of the assault force, including its U.S. and Caribbean components were included. It was, or would pass for, a comprehensive overview of events on the spot.

The third front page story, the second filed from Washington, was by Bernard Gwertzman. The story was positioned at the bottom of the page and explored the reasoning which led to the decision to invade, the likely political ramifications, domestically and worldwide, and the possible public opinion consequences for the administration. This story also pointed out some of the similarities between the Grenada and earlier Dominican Republic invasions. If the stories by Smith and Kaufman were reportage, this by Gwertzman was, generally, analysis.

From London and Barnaby J. Feder came front page story number four. It began in the middle of the page, and it focused on British reaction. Feder reported "harsh criticism" of both the British government and President Reagan. He also reported British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's recommendation to President Reagan that he "reconsider the attack."

Finally, at the lower right hand corner, was a backgrounder by Francis X. Clines. This was the third piece from Washington, and it provided a chronology of events during the days leading up to the invasion. This story outlined the simultaneous planning for and denial of the invasion. It recounted the President's movements and meetings during those days, and, on an interior page where it concluded, it was accompanied by several White House photographs as well as one from the Associated Press.

In support of these five stories, an additional 17 ran inside the *Times'* first section. Also inside were the text of President Reagan's announcement of the invasion, the transcript of Sec. Shultz's news conference, the text of a letter from the OECS requesting U. S. military intervention, and the text of the article in the OECS Treaty which was used to justify that intervention. Maps and photographs (two photos and a map on the front page alone) rounded out the coverage. In addition to the five photos accompanying Clines' background chronology, the were a total of eight others on internal pages. Two maps were used, one on the front page showing the island and its location in the Caribbean and the other showing the deployment of U.S. troops throughout the world.

Among the 17 interior articles were stories dealing with how the invasion troops were trained, how quickly they achieved the invasion's objectives, and how Cuba had ordered its nationals not to give up. World and regional opinion were covered in stories about statements from Moscow, France, the United Nations, other nations in the hemisphere, and the OECS. Additional background pieces included items about the global state of U.S. military preparedness, stories about the St. George's University School of Medicine and its founder, one about the island itself, one on the role of ham radio operators in the news gathering process, one covering Barbados as a staging point for troops and a gathering point for journalists, and one on the difficulties of journalism by communiqué. Finally, both the editorial and Op-Ed pages carried comment on the invasion.

For a war that had been blacked out by the administration in Washington, the *Times* had managed to put together an amount of coverage that was nothing short of remarkable. The question that immediately occurs to one is where did it

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all originate? What were the sources? There are a number of probable answers. For one thing, the several days of turmoil preceding the invasion had given the *Times* ample opportunity to prepare or update some of its backgrounders. Secondly, State and Defense department sources had given to reporters much of the material published by the *Times*. Also a number of pieces were mere transcriptions or reproductions of documented materials. Nevertheless, others resulted from reporting. The sources of these stories tell how the *Times* put its coverage together.

A close of examination of those sources, especially those for front page stories, shows the following. In the lead story, five sources were identified by name. In addition to the President and Sec. of State, these included Senators Daniel P. Moynihan (Dem., N.Y.) and Charles Percy (Rep., Ill.). Percy was obviously contacted by virtue of his position as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Speaker of the House Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill, Jr. (Dem., Mass.) was also cited. Of the eight other sources for this story, one was a Pentagon communiqué, six were indicated by general titles such as "diplomats" from several countries, "British government sources," and "administration officials." Finally, the article referred to a Cuban radio broadcast quoted by the Associated Press.

So, to recapitulate, out of 13 separate sources cited, only five were named. Among the five were the President and Sec. of State whose remarks were issued in news conferences. Three were politicians commenting on the invasion announcement. Two other official ("Pentagon" or "administration") but unnamed sources were mentioned. Several diplomats gave their opinions without allowing attribution, and a second hand report from another news agency was used.

The second, front page lead, that by Kaufman, was based on similar sources. Reporting on the actual battle activities, this article used a total of 14 different sources. Again, however, the majority were not named. Only two, in fact, were identified by name. These were Prime Minister Edward P.G. Seaga of Jamaica and Vaughan Lewis, the Director General of the OECS. Seaga reported the taking of "all major objectives" by the invasion force which included Jamaican troops. He also reported that three civilians had been killed. Lewis explained the invasion as having resulted from the alarm of countries in the region over what he called the destabilizing nature of "the military buildup in Grenada." Unnamed officials of the OECS were also cited. Several other names of individuals were used in the story, but none was identified as a source of the information developed. For example, the story said that the Prime Ministers of Jamaica, Dominica and Barbados had consulted with U.S. Ambassador Millard Bush and that the troops from these countries were led by Col. Ken Barnes, a Tinidadian serving in the Jamaican Defense Forces. Not one of those mentioned was given as a source for any of these statements.

Among the other unnamed sources for this second lead story, were military and intelligence officials in the Caribbean. The phrasing kept the reader in the dark not only about the names of these officials but also about whose officials they were, and where precisely in the Caribbean they might be. Similarly mysterious sources included one "who had returned from Grenada," and "military analysts here," all, apparently, persons with neither name nor country. A few of the nameless conceded their origins and locations. Thus, one group were officials of the Barbados government and another were Barbadian military spokesmen in Grenada (although the report never explained how contact with such a spokesmen was made). Also cited were U.S. Defense Department and other government officials in Washington. A Grenada National Democratic Movement spokesman held a news conference in Barbados to praise the invasion's results. He was

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quoted, but his name was not given. Finally, radio stations and broadcasters were also mentioned as sources.

Interestingly, some of the most specific details mentioned in the Kaufman story were not attributed at all. For instance, the local source of a report about the killing of one Marine was not identified in any way; it was simply "reported here." The slowing of the advancing invaders by fire "from the area of the central post office" was simply "reported," as was fighting at the Grenadian Army headquarters, Fort Rupert, and at Fort Cedric on the outskirts of St George's. Absolutely no attribution accompanied the statement that a second body of invaders "at Pearls Airport 13 miles northeast of St George's" would be moving southward. What is perhaps of some significance about many of these reports is the fact that they are of a type which would not normally be allowed even by combat journalists accompanying military forces. After all, these items included information and descriptions of troop movements as well as troop strength.

If the Reagan administration's purpose in banning reporters from the scene of the invasion was to maintain secrecy and the element of surprise, the *Times'* reporting was not contributing to that objective. But more to the point, the *Times* was reporting, usually second hand, and sometimes no hand at all, the minute details of a war that no one but the participants and the Grenadian people had seen.

the other front page stories did not cover that war directly. One, citing British and French reaction to the invasion, was merely a reprise of official statements. Another, the chronology of the President's activities, was, with one notable exception attributed totally to anonymous sources. The exception was a statement by the President's press secretary Larry Speakes explaining why he had, unknowingly he said, misled reporters regarding the invasion. Finally, the analytical piece, the story dealing with the unstated reasons for the invasion, cited unnamed administration, White House, State Department, and Defense Department sources as well as a foreign diplomat and, more specifically, European diplomats.

Only one of the 17 interior stories dealt with military activities in the Grenada invasion. That piece by B. Drummond Ayres, Jr. relied heavily on Pentagon officials, citing that source or some variation of it 15 times. Once government officials were cited. No named sources appeared in the story.

Out of three stories (two on the front page and one interior) directly reporting the invasion, only two had any attributed sources. the first included official statements and comments by five named individuals. The second had two named sources. No military sources spoke on the record in any of the stories, nor did any other government officials besides the President and Sec. of State. In the first two of these stories, a total of 27 different sources were mentioned. Among these in both stories were unnamed Defense Department or government officials. The third story came entirely from either military or government sources. All told then, perhaps a few more than two dozen sources, fewer than a third of them identified by name, provided the *Times* with this information for its main invasion stories. Most of these sources had no first hand knowledge of the event they were reporting to the *Times*. Among the information which the *Times* reported with a mere semblance of attribution, or with no attribution at all, were details of troops positions, troop movements, troop strength and hostile encounters. Who one wonders were the real sources of all this information?

The Dominican Republic. Fighting in the Dominican Republic capital city of Santo Domingo had begun on April 25, 1965. The previous day, supporters of exiled former President Juan Bosch had first declared their revolt against the

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military leadership of the country and their intention to return to power the former president who had been removed in a military coup d'etat in 1963. On Apr. 25, planes flown by pilots sympathetic with the revolt, strafed the Presidential Palace in Santo Domingo. As the intensity of fighting increased, the ruling authorities in the capital advised the U.S. that the lives of American nationals could not be safeguarded. That was apparently enough for President Johnson to act.

By Apr. 26 the U.S. was already sending a Navy task force to the area. On Tuesday, Apr. 27, a small contingent of Marines went ashore to organize and supervise the evacuation of Americans. They were there to direct traffic and guard the evacuees. On Apr. 28, they got nearly 1,400 U.S. citizens out of the capital and onto Navy ships which brought them to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Approximately another 1,800 remained in the Dominican Republic, perhaps half of that number or fewer in the capital.

The landing of a significant U.S. force occurred on Apr. 28, the same day that a much smaller group of Marines had easily evacuated about half of the U.S. citizens in Santo Domingo. The Marines were now under orders to protect and evacuate not only U.S. nationals but also those from other countries who might request assistance. However, officially, they were not to take sides in the fighting between the military junta's forces and the pro-Bosch parties. At this point the northern and central parts of the city were in rebel hands.

The front page of the *New York Times* on Apr. 29, 1965 was markedly different from that which appeared the day after the Grenada invasion. No banner headline announced the troop landing in the Dominican Republic. Instead, the *Times* featured two stories and a photograph under a 3-line, 3-column headline:

PRESIDENT SEND MARINES
TO RESCUE CITIZENS OF U.S.
FROM DOMINICAN FIGHTING

The right hand lead under that head was written by Charles Mohr of the *Times* and was filed from Washington the previous night. Mohr's story told about the landing of 405 troops on Wednesday, Apr. 28, at a polo field about three miles west of the downtown area of Santo Domingo. This story also reported that the U.S. Ambassador's residence had been fired upon by machine-gun on the day of the troop landing. The story mentioned that some Washington officials believed there were Communist leaders among the rebels. No one, however, claimed that the Communists were controlling the forces fighting the junta.

Little news of the actual fighting was reported in Mohr's piece. In fact, the story simply cited sources as having said that "Anti-Bosch forces had fought their way into the capital" and that there had been a "breakdown of law and order" as the fighting continued. The same sources said that "leaders of three different Communist organizations hand been identified as being among the anti-Reid (that is pro-Bosch) rebels and had been seen leading armed 'rabble.'"

Only three sources were cited for Mohr's information. A statement by President Johnson was one. The others were unnamed Washington "officials" and "informants."

The second front page story was given a 2-line, 2-column headline:

Pro-Bosch Rebels Holding
Parts of Dominican Capital.

Filed from San Juan, P.R., this story was written by Tad Szulc. In it Szulc reported that the rebels had taken control of parts of the Santo Domingo. He mentioned an Associated Press story reporting gunfire in the city's outskirts. He cited reports from the junta that attacks had been made on arms stored in the northern section of the city. Also mentioned were problems with power and food

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supplies. Szulc included an estimate of casualties and concluded with a quote from Bosch himself who was in exile in San Juan.

For his report, Szulc cited three Dominican sources. In fact, two of these may have been the same. They were "telephone reports" from the capital and "informants" in that city. His third Dominican source was a radio broadcast from the airbase at San Isidro, where the junta's military were located. In addition, Szulc used the two other sources already mention, the AP report and Bosch.

On an interior page, the *Times* ran two additional stories of modest length, the text of President Johnson's remarks, and six brief items of various lengths. The longest of these briefs was seven short paragraphs. Four others were three paragraphs or less. In one of these stories, the *Times* covered the arrival of a group of 50 evacuated U.S. citizens at Kennedy International Airport. Statements about conditions in Santo Domingo were made by two businessmen, one from Queens and the other from New Jersey. The second interior story, a historical background, outlined U.S. Marine intervention in the Caribbean form 1776. No sources were cited.

The briefs covered a wide range of topics. A one-paragraph story with a San Juan dateline reported the number of U.S. evacuees to reach that city (1,172). The source of that number was not given. A second San Juan story, this one four paragraphs long, told of tourists dodging bullets and cited the "refugees" from the Navy transports as well as a New York lawyer. The name of the latter was given. A two paragraph story from Havana reported accusations against the U.S. made by Cuba on Havana radio. The station also mentioned that recently armed civilians were refusing to give up their weapons to Dominican military forces. Another single-paragraph brief, this one from Washington, indirectly quoted José A. Bonilla, the Dominican Ambassador there, as laying the blame for the insurrection on Communists. A three-paragraph piece, also datelined Washington, cited a State Department report about the U.S. shipping medical supplies to the Dominican Republic.

The longest of the briefs, the seven-paragraph story, was a Reuters piece datelined Santo Domingo. This story discussed the reported strengthening of the rebel position in the battle. It also mentioned the number of wounded and "'a pretty savage drumhead kind of justice'" in the city, citing a report that 12 people had been shot by a crowd. Finally, it said that the head of the "short-lived" rebel regime had sought refuge in the Columbian Embassy. The source for all this information was a U.S. Embassy spokeman.

In the only other item published, the President cited U.S. and Dominican military sources. He named an American General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as having told him that there were no incidents.

Five stories dealing with the Dominican invasion had actually reported on the fighting. In the first, Mohr's story, the President and unnamed Washington informants and officials were cited. In the second by Szulc, five distinct sources were mentioned although only one, Bosch, was named and two of the others may have been identical. In the third story, the Reuters report, a single American embassy official was cited as a source. Two other stories dealing with evacuees used actual names of U.S. citizens who had been in the midst of the shooting but whose exodus from the country was practically coincidental with the landing of the major Marine force on April 28th.

To sum up, then, although no ban on the press prevented coverage from being more elaborate, the *Times* produced a total of only two front page stories, one interior backgrounder, one moderately sized piece on evacuee reaction, a reproduction of the President's remarks, and six smallish briefs -- a total of 11

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stories. One front page photograph and a map on an interior page supported these stories. The information from these stories came from 16 sources. Of those, only six were named.

Conclusion. At the beginning of this paper several questions were posed. Did the first day coverage of the two Caribbean invasions differ? Undoubtedly, they did. How did they differ? First, there was several times as much coverage of the Grenada invasion, the invasion from which reporters were banned. Little more than two columns of the front page, and about half of one interior page were filled with stories about the Dominican invasion. For Grenada the *Times* devoted five-sixths of the front page and nearly six full interior pages along with items on three other pages. From the perspective of quantity the *Times* had two and one half times as many items (28 versus 11) in its first day Grenada coverage as in its first day Dominican coverage. In pages, the *Times'* Grenada coverage was about six times as great as its Dominican coverage. However, the *Times* did not produce its greater coverage of the Grenada invasion from a proportionately greater number of sources. It used only half again as many sources as it had used to generate its earlier coverage of the Dominican Republic invasion. And as for named sources, the numbers were almost even in stories dealing with actual hostilities.

What accounts for these differences? Perhaps with nearly a quarter century of experience behind it and with more modern electronic newsgathering and processing technologies, the *Times* was able to expand its output enormously in the more recent invasion coverage. Perhaps the circumstances surrounding the Dominican invasion did not appear to involve a potential for a shooting war. After all, the Dominican invasion was announced as a peacekeeping affair in which American troops were merely to police the streets. In Grenada, we went in shooting. Then again, the country was already concerned about its commitments in Southeast Asia at the time when the Dominican invasion occurred. Perhaps, this small nearby island in the Caribbean seemed less ominous than Vietnam.

Finally, the *Times* was dealing with an entirely different type of administration in Washington in each case. The Reagan administration were considered adept at using media. They had the stories which they wanted told ready and waiting. There were always those unnamed official sources to give reporters details.

Initially one might conclude, based on these differences, that a diligent newspaper can cover even a blacked out war. Such a conclusion is only partly true. For every unprovable statement, every unchallengable affirmation, every unverifiable source, there is a potential for misinformation. As later coverage showed, much of what was reported initially in the Grenada invasion was subsequently proved erroneous. Voluminous coverage alone, then, is insufficient to provide adequate information to a watchful and concerned public. While one must praise the *Times* for what it accomplished under difficult circumstances in Grenada, it is a good idea to temper that praise with an admonition against self-satisfaction with a job only partially done.

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